B r i e f c o m m u n i c at i o n s A wealth of field and laboratory studies have shown that humans are often willing to sacrifice their own economic payoffs in the interest of being honest, even in the absence of punishment or reputational factors 1, 2 . At the neural level, there is substantial evidence from both neuroimaging [3] [4] [5] [6] and developmental 7, 8 literatures that the prefrontal cortices, in particular dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC) and orbito frontal (OFC) cortices, are critical to decisions involving honesty. Owing to the inherently correlational nature of such data, however, the specific roles of these regions in honesty and dishonesty remains unclear. Here we sought to characterize the causal contribution of these regions by comparing the behavior of patients with focal lesions to either the DLPFC or OFC to that of healthy comparison participants in a battery of signaling games extensively studied in behavioral eco nomics and evolutionary biology 9,10 ( Fig. 1, Supplementary Figs. 1  and 2, Supplementary Table 1 and Online Methods). These games capture a core dilemma involved in honest behavior where interests of the signaler conflict with those of the signal receiver, such as that of a seller (signaler) choosing to either truthfully disclose or misrepresent information about a product's quality, which has direct monetary con sequences for the buyer (signal receiver).
First, in the 'message' condition, the participant in the role of the signaler can send one of two messages to an anonymous counterpart in the role of the signal recipient, on the basis of which the recipient chooses one of two monetary allocations associated with the mes sages ( Fig. 2a and Online Methods) 2, 10 . Importantly, both players were instructed that only the signaler would be informed about the monetary consequences associated with each option, and that recipi ents would never know whether a message they received was true (Online Methods). This highlights the fact that the signal recipient is entirely reliant upon the signaler for potential information about the options and prevents the recipient from using payoff information to make inferences about signaler behavior 2, 10 . Second, to account for possible baseline differences in altruistic tendencies, we included a 'choice' condition that contained matching monetary consequences to those in the message condition (Online Methods). The only difference between the conditions was that, in the choice condition, participants directly chose between option A and option B. An individual who is completely insensitive to honesty concerns will behave identically in the two conditions, whereas those sensitive to honesty concerns are predicted to behave more generously in the message condition. All choices were conducted using hypothetical payoffs and no feedback, with order of message and choice blocks counterbalanced across participants within each cohort (Online Methods and Supplementary Table 2 ).
We first investigated how introduction of honesty concerns affected choice behavior in healthy participants by comparing altruistic giving in the message and choice conditions, defined as the amount received by the recipient following implementation of the participant's decision, Substantial correlational evidence suggests that prefrontal regions are critical to honest and dishonest behavior, but causal evidence specifying the nature of this involvement remains absent. We found that lesions of the human dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) decreased the effect of honesty concerns on behavior in economic games that pit honesty motives against self-interest, but did not affect decisions when honesty concerns were absent. These results point to a causal role for DLPFC in honest behavior. which for simplicity we refer to as "amount given" (Online Methods). Using paired comparisons on decisions with identical monetary consequences, we found that, as consistent with previous studies in healthy participants 1,2,10 , inclusion of honesty concerns in the message condition substantially increased altruistic giving com pared to the choice condition (Wilcoxon signedrank test, P < 0.001, twotailed; Fig. 2b) .
To test the extent to which prefrontal regions are causally involved in tradeoffs between honesty concerns and economic selfinterest, we next compared amount given between the message and choice conditions in patients with lesions to either DLPFC or OFC versus healthy participants. We found significant main effects of both con dition (Wilcoxon signedrank test, P < 0.001, twotailed), such that participants on average gave more in the message condition ($7.90 ± 0.20) than in the choice condition ($4.14 ± 0.24), and cohort (Kruskal Wallis test, P < 0.001, twotailed), such that DLPFC patients ($7.17 ± 0.33) on average gave less than healthy participants ($8.91 ± 0.19) and OFC patients ($8.30 ± 0.35). Critically, we observed a significant interaction between condition and cohort (KruskalWallis test on paired difference in amount given across three cohorts, P < 0.001, two tailed), such that damage to DLPFC was associated with significantly lower giving amounts than other cohorts in the message condition but not in the choice condition, suggesting a reduction in the sensitivity to honesty concerns without changes in baseline altruistic tendencies on the part of DLPFC patients ( Fig. 2b and Supplementary Figs. 3-5 ). All results were robust to using parametric statistical tests. For addi tional details on the relationship between behavior and demographic variables and lesion laterality, see Supplementary Figure 3 and Supplementary Table 3 .
To assess the possibility that deficits in cognitive processes unre lated to honesty may have produced the observed behavioral differ ences, we first separated decisions in the message condition where honesty and selfinterest were in conflict from decisions where the two were aligned (Online Methods). If behavioral patterns observed in DLPFC cohort reflected general impairments such as misunder standing of payoffs or different beliefs about the behavior of the signal recipients, we would expect DLPFC patients to be affected on both types of decisions. In contrast, we found that DLPFC patients were selectively affected in conflict trials (Fig. 2c , top) and were indistinguishable from healthy or OFC cohorts in noconflict trials (Fig. 2c, bottom; Supplementary Fig. 3b ). In addition, we did not find support for the hypothesis that DLPFC patients exhibited more random choice behavior in the message condition, therefore exerting downward bias on the effect of honesty ( Supplementary  Fig. 6 ). For additional behavioral results validating task design, see Supplementary Figures 7 and 8 .
The above results are thus consistent with previous suggestions that DLPFC influences value computations by diminishing subjective value associated with the pursuit of immediate selfinterest 11, 12 . To formally test this mechanistic hypothesis, we used a computational approach to characterize how parametric variation in costs and ben efits associated with honesty influenced choice behavior in our dif ferent cohorts. Specifically, we assumed that the subjective value of an option is influenced not only by monetary consequences to self and other but also the means (honest or dishonest) by which these out comes are obtained (Online Methods and Supplementary Table 4 ) 10 . We found that the weight placed on participants' own payoff decreased in the message condition (α M ) for the OFC and healthy compari son cohorts by approximately 50% relative to the choice condition (α C ; Fig. 3a) . Strikingly, DLPFC patients' choices did not exhibit a significant discrepancy in the weight across two conditions (Fig. 3b) , and were significantly different from those of both healthy compari son and OFC cohorts (Fig. 3b) .
Together, our findings suggest that DLPFC is necessary for promot ing honesty concerns over selfinterested motives and argue against the widely proposed view that the involvement of prefrontal regions in honesty reflects the need to engage regulatory processes to override truthful responses and implement selfinterest 3, 13 . Under the latter hypothesis, damage to prefrontal regions should have been associated with an increased sensitivity to honesty concerns, resulting in greater altruistic tendencies when honesty came into conflict with self interest. Instead, the current results are consistent with the idea that control is necessary to curb selfinterest motives in order to com municate the truth, and further suggest that previous neuroimaging findings of DLPFC engagement during dishonest behavior reflect active, but ultimately unsuccessful, engagement of control processes, consistent with observations that individuals with control deficits often engage DLPFC more 14, 15 . In the message condition, the participant in the role of the signaler is presented with two options, A and B, associated with different monetary consequences. For example, option A corresponds to $15 to the participant and $5 to an anonymous signal recipient-i.e., ($15, $5)-and option B corresponds to ($5, $15). There are two actions available to the participant in the form of two statements describing the monetary consequences of the options to the recipient: the participants must choose between sending a truthful message (message 2) that sacrifices economic self-interest in favor of honesty or a false message (message 1) that satisfies self-interest at the expense of being honest. See Online Methods for details. (b) Amount given. In the choice condition, all cohorts gave similar amounts to the recipient (healthy comparison (HC), $7.44 ± 0.22; DLPFC, $6.65 ± 0.38; OFC, $6.79 ± 0.35; Kruskal-Wallis test, P = 0.15, twotailed). In the message condition with identical monetary consequences but with the addition of honesty concerns, the HC cohort increased giving by $2.94 ± 0.44. In contrast, the DLPFC cohort's giving increased by less than half this amount ($1.05 ± 0.43), significantly lower than the increase by the HC cohort (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, P < 0.001, two-tailed). OFC participants were nearly identical to HC participants ($3.01 ± 0.55; Wilcoxon ranksum test, P = 0.65, two-tailed), and significantly different from DLPFC participants (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, P < 0.001, two-tailed). (c) Conflict and no conflict trials. On trials in the message condition where honesty motives conflicted with those of self-interest (top), DLPFC patients made a significantly lower proportion of honest choices (36.7% ± 5.75%) compared to OFC and HC cohorts (OFC patients, 75.7% ± 5.44%; HC, 83.3% ± 3.00%; Fisher's exact test, P < 0.01 for both, two-tailed). In contrast, on trials where conflict was absent (bottom), there were no significant differences between cohorts (Fisher's exact test, P = 0.25, two-tailed). All error bars indicate s.e.m. In contrast to the DLPFC, we did not observe an effect of OFC damage on behavior, which might reflect a number of features of our task, including the reduction of anticipated guilt and lack of strong affective components (Supplementary Fig. 9 ) 16, 17 . At the same time, we cannot completely rule out possible contributions from non PFCbased processes to honesty owing to the presence of damage to white matter and in some cases the extension of damage into adjacent regions in our lesion sample ( Fig. 1 and Supplementary Figs. 1 and 2) . Future studies combining larger lesion cohorts with functional connectivity measures will be needed to address these questions 18 . More broadly, by connecting tools and ideas from behavioral eco nomics and theoretical biology with those of cognitive neuroscience, our study raises exciting questions regarding to what degree the neurocomputational substrates of honesty are shared with other types of normguided and moral behavior 19, 20 , as well as what neural mech anisms arbitrate between such norms in cases of conflict.
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Methods and any associated references are available in the online version of the paper. Figure 3 Computational modeling. (a) Green shaded region captures willingness to sacrifice one's own payoffs to send the true message-that is, bias toward honesty, where weight on self-interest in the message condition (α M ) is reduced relative to the choice condition (α C ). Conversely, red shaded region captures willingness to sacrifice one's own payoffs to send the false message-that is, bias toward dishonesty, where α M is greater than α C . All cohorts placed similar weights on one's own payoff in the choice condition (DLPFC, 0.82 ± 0.05; OFC, 0.79 ± 0.07; healthy comparison (HC), 0.73 ± 0.05). In the message condition, OFC and HC participants showed a significant reduction in weight on own payoff, whereas DLPFC participants did not differ significantly between the two conditions (DLPFC, 0.75 ± 0.09; OFC, 0.43 ± 0.06; HC, 0.29 ± 0.04). Dark points represent parameter estimates and smaller points represent bootstrap pseudo-sample estimates. Dashed ellipses correspond to bootstrapped s.e.m. (b) Taking paired-wise differences in pseudo-sample estimates of α M and α C , OFC and HC participants showed significantly lower weights on own payoff in the message condition as compared to the choice condition (P < 0.01, two-tailed), whereas the DLPFC cohort did not exhibit a significant difference (P = 0.49, two-tailed; all error bars indicate bootstrap s.e.m.). npg oNLINe MeThoDS
Subjects.
Patients with focal brain lesions to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (n = 7) and orbitofrontal cortex (n = 7) were included in the experiment (see Supplementary Table 1 for details). Healthy comparison participants (n = 27) were recruited from the San Francisco Bay area, California. All subjects provided informed consent approved by the University of California, Berkeley, California. One DLPFC lesion patient answered incorrectly on more than 50% of post instruction questionnaires and was excluded from the study. In comparison, all other subjects answered at least 90% of the questions correctly. All statistical results reported in the study were robust to inclusion of this participant. lesion reconstruction. Software reconstructions were performed using MRIcron 21 . For both patient groups, testing took place at least 6 months after the date of the stroke or accident. A neurologist (R.T.K.) inspected patient MRIs to ensure that no white matter hyperintensities outside the lesioned area were observed in either patient group. All traumatic brain injury patients had lowimpact force injuries with no clinical or MRI evidence of axonal shear.
Signaling games. We used a battery of signaling games extensively studied in behavioral economics and evolutionary biology 9, 10 . These games capture a core dilemma involved in honest behavior where interests of the signaler conflict with those of the signal receiver, such as that of a seller (signaler) choosing to either truthfully disclose or misrepresent information about a product's quality, which has direct monetary consequences for the buyer (signal receiver).
These games have three important advantages as an assay of decisions involv ing tradeoffs between honesty and selfinterest. First, to isolate the effects of honesty, we included a set of message and choice conditions. Because the latter condition does not include honesty concerns, we remove the tension between honesty and other social preferences and are able to control for participants' concerns for equity and efficiency. As a result, systematic deviations in behavior between the two sets of games can be interpreted as being affected by honesty concerns. Specifically, an individual who is completely insensitive to honesty concerns will behave identically in the two conditions, whereas those sensitive to honesty concerns are predicted to behave more generously in the message condition. In previous experiments using these games, introduction of honesty concerns in the message condition has been found to increase cooperation rates and altruistic giving by approximately 50% (refs. 1,2,10,22) .
Second, the clearly delineated costbenefit relationship associated with self interest and honesty facilitates a computational account of honesty, which allows us to better connect the potential behavioral differences to their computational substrates. Finally, and importantly in the context of lesion studies, by explicitly presenting honest and selfinterested actions to subjects, the message condition allows us to hold constant the available action set across cohorts and verify understanding. This included both comprehension tests and control trials with no conflict between honesty and selfinterest. message and choice conditions. In the message condition, the participant in the role of signaler was presented with two options, A and B, which yielded dif ferent monetary outcomes. For example, in Supplementary Figure 10 , option A corresponded to $6 to the signaler and $5 to an anonymous random signal recipient-that is, ($6, $5)-and option B corresponded to ($5, $10). Only the signaler knew the payoffs associated with the options, and the signaler had to send either an honest or dishonest message to an anonymous recipient. The recipient did not know the associated payoffs but had to choose one of the two options. That is, the signaler could either choose to convey the truth, "Option B will earn you more money than option A, " or a falsehood, "Option A will earn you more money than option B". Importantly, all signalers were informed that recipients would never know the payment information associated with each option and therefore whether senders' messages were true or not.
The monetary outcomes varied across trials. In particular, in some trials we pitted selfinterest against honesty. That is, honest choices were associated with allocations that yielded less payment to the participant and more to the recipient (for example, $5 for self, $15 for other in option A; versus $6 for self, $5 for other in option B). We refer to these trials as "conflict trials. " In "noconflict trials, " honest choices were associated with allocations that yielded more payment to both participant and recipient (for example, $8 for self, $10 for other in option A; versus $10 for self, $12 for other in option B). A full list of trial options is presented in Supplementary Table 2 .
As a control condition, we also included the choice condition associated with the same set of payoff allocations. In particular, participants were asked to directly choose either option A or option B. Following the procedure of previ ous experiments using the message and choice condition 2 , participants were informed that in the choice condition (i) their decisions would be implemented 80% of the time, while the other 20% of the time the alternative option would be implemented; and (ii) receivers would not know the monetary payoff associated with each option and would just receive money passively.
Procedure. Following task instructions and a comprehension quiz, participants were administered two blocks of message and choice condition trials, each con taining 12 trials. All choices were conducted using hypothetical payoffs and no feedback, with order of message and choice blocks counterbalanced across par ticipants within each cohort. Within each block, questions were presented in a random order. For complete experimental instructions, see http://neuroecon. berkeley.edu/papers.html.
Behavioral analysis. In both conditions, the behavioral measure of altruistic giving was defined as the amount that would be received by the recipient if the participant's decision was implemented, which for simplicity we refer to as "amount given. " Using payoffs given in Supplementary Figure 10 as an example, the amount given in the message condition by a participant choosing the truth ful (false) message 2 (1) would be defined as $10 ($5). Similarly, in the choice condition, the amount given by a participant choosing option A (B) would be defined as $5 ($10). computational modeling. To characterize the relative contributions of economic selfinterest, distributional preference and honesty consideration to allocation decisions, we adapted an economic model that was previously applied to study social preferences 23 to our tasks.
First, denote M s and M o as monetary payoffs for self and other respectively. The indicator function I is equal to 1 when the monetary payoff is achieved through dishonesty and 0 otherwise. That is, I indicates whether honesty con cerns are overridden. We propose that the decisionmaker's utility is modulated by honesty in addition to monetary allocations to self and other In the context of our game, we refer to α as the weight placed on own payoff in the choice condition, as there is no tradeoff between selfinterest and hon esty. That is, α C = α. In contrast, the weight placed on one's own payoff in the message condition is defined by α C = α − δ. Critically, the parameter δ can be interpreted as the degree to which honesty reduces selfinterested motives. If δ > 0, the signaler suffers from a disutility of deception and is more likely to sacrifice selfinterest in favor of honesty concerns. In contrast, if δ < 0, the signaler receives an additional utility from dishonesty, and thus is more likely to choose dishonest options. Finally, if δ = 0, the signaler is indifferent between honest or dishonest actions and will behave as if the tradeoff between honesty and dishonesty does not exist. The combination of these parameters thus nests a wide range of social preferences proposed by existing theory and allows for rich interactions among economic selfinterest, distributional preferences and honesty considerations.
To calibrate the model given the binary choice behavior of each cohort in the game, we adopted the standard logit assumption, aggregated observations npg conditional on lesion cohorts and experimental conditions and conducted maxi mal likelihood estimation, specifically maximizing the log likelihood function 
